Association for Information Systems

AIS Electronic Library (AISeL)
ACIS 2002 Proceedings

Australasian (ACIS)

12-31-2002

Trust in Online Auctions: an exploratory study of
the link between reputatuion and exchange
relationships of eBay traders
Eva Murray
Challenger International Ltd, Hobart, Tasmania

Carol Pollard
University of Tasmania

Follow this and additional works at: http://aisel.aisnet.org/acis2002
Recommended Citation
Murray, Eva and Pollard, Carol, "Trust in Online Auctions: an exploratory study of the link between reputatuion and exchange
relationships of eBay traders" (2002). ACIS 2002 Proceedings. 94.
http://aisel.aisnet.org/acis2002/94

This material is brought to you by the Australasian (ACIS) at AIS Electronic Library (AISeL). It has been accepted for inclusion in ACIS 2002
Proceedings by an authorized administrator of AIS Electronic Library (AISeL). For more information, please contact elibrary@aisnet.org.

Trust in Online Auctions: an exploratory study of the link between
reputation and exchange relationships of eBay traders
Eva Murray
Carol Pollard
Challenger International Ltd
GPO Box 407
Hobart Tasmania
School of Information Systems
University of Tasmania
Hobart, Australia
emurray@challengergroup.com.au
Abstract
This research explored the Internet based phenomenon of eBay, an online auction house
where goods are bought and sold in an international market. The aim of this research was to
reveal selected eBay traders’ underlying attitudes, specifically with respect to issues
surrounding the notion of trust. A qualitative methodology via case study technique was the
approach used to guide the study. Nine eBay traders from various countries, such as
Australia, the UK and the US were interviewed. The eBay traders’ experiences and
understandings of this phenomenon were shared through individual, semi-structured
interviews. A major finding uncovered by this research was the high level of trust the
participants displayed towards other eBay traders. This finding may serve to explain why
eBay has become one of the most successful online auctions in such a short period of time.
This research also uncovered that there were several factors that influenced trust between
trading partners. These factors included the feedback system and risk.
Keywords
Trust, eBay, online auctions, person-to-person trading, risk, fraud, reputation, exchange
relationships, Internet shopping

INTRODUCTION
Online auctions such as eBay have become a cultural phenomenon where numerous
individuals around the world trade unwanted household items as a hobby/ business. This
grassroots revolution has enabled person-to-person commerce to prosper on a worldwide
scale (Chui and Zwick, 1999; Gardner, 1999). One reason for the popularity of online
auctions is they are enjoyable and entertaining.
In person-to-person dealings, users buy from an individual and the interaction between
customers is informal. For instance, buyers purchasing items from individuals often send
personal cheques or cash through regular mail before they receive their goods.
Communication between the two parties is relaxed and friendly (Hurley, 1998).
However, person-to-person online auction sites such as eBay do not verify goods listed by
sellers. As a result, reproductions can be passed off as rare antiques and items purchased
recently can be marketed as collectibles (Maggs, 2000). Furthermore, there are no control
mechanisms in place to prevent sellers from conspiring with other sellers to bid on each
other’s items (Gardner, 1999). Online auction sites state that fraud is a minor occurrence,
however the amount of attempted fraud may be difficult to calculate. Online auction houses
offer escrow services and refunds for buyers who do not receive items, usually between
AUD$200-$300. They also offer a feedback forum to reduce the likelihood of fraud. The
feedback forum enables all online auction users to leave comments about each other’s
buying and selling experiences to encourage trust based upon reputation (Kelsey, 2000).
Despite the threat of fraud, sellers continue to auction more merchandise and bidders
continue to bid up (Greenfield, 2000).
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Although research into online auctions is increasing, the majority of such studies consider
online auctions to be analogous to offline auctions. However, the Internet produces a new
virtual reality with implications that do not match anything in the offline world (Shneiderman
et al., 1998). For instance, in the offline auction world, buyers have the opportunity to touch
the item to verify its legitimacy. Moreover, once buyers have placed a bid successfully they
pay the auctioneer who then provides them with the purchased goods. By contrast, in the
online auction world, buyers cannot touch and feel the item to verify its authenticity and as
such, have to rely upon the seller’s word. Furthermore, when buyers dispatch payment they
have to trust that the seller will send the item as promised.
Given the recent developments discussed above, further examination of the appeal, trust
and risk issues are warranted. Therefore, this study investigated person-to-person auction
websites, using data acquired via a selection of users from eBay. eBay provided an
appropriate example due to the numerous auctions and registered users it enjoys. The aim
of this research was to gain a deep understanding of what makes online users trust other
individual users they have never met. Moreover, the research was interested in discovering
online auction users’ belief systems to uncover factors that are important to them when
trading with other individuals. More specifically, the aim of this research was to answer one
main research question: What factors facilitate trust in eBay traders’ and the eBay system?
The paper continues by discussing the theoretical foundations surrounding online auctions,
particularly trust issues and in doing so, highlights those areas in which research may be
lacking and where gaps in understanding are evident. The paper then discusses the
methodological issues and approach used to guide and inform this study. Finally, the paper
presents a discussion of the analysis and discusses the implications for future online auction
practices and research.

THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS
Trust can be described as a subjective process in which buyers evaluate a seller on the
basis that a seller will complete a specific transaction according to their certain beliefs and
expectations (Gambetta, 1988). Williamson (1991) outlines three sources of trust in
commerce as interpersonal contact, values and reputation. In the majority of electronic
commerce transactions however, interpersonal contact is absent and values are not clearly
developed (Fung and Lee, 1999). Therefore, the most common source of trust in electronic
commerce is reputation (Williamson, 1991).
Reputation has business worth and has been considered as a main precursor to trust
(Hawes et al., 1989). As trust cannot be easily detected, reputation is used as a substitute
for trust. Therefore, trust is perceived as a means of lessening risk for particular
transactions, which enables sellers to obtain price premiums for merchandise sold. In
contrast, sellers with less trustworthy reputations cannot demand a price premium, as
buyers require a return for accepting extra risk when they conduct business with such sellers
(Pavlou and Ba, 2000; Langdon and Smith, 1998).
Reputation has meaning only in an unsure world and therefore, reputation provides warning
signs for the market regarding whether a seller is honest or dishonest. Trust is the main
catalyst in most buyer-seller relationships, particularly when two specific conditions are
present, namely ambiguity or uncertainty (risk) and information on goods for sale is limited or
deficient (information asymmetry). Such conditions may tempt the seller to behave
opportunistically (Pavlou and Ba, 2000). Facing risk and information asymmetry, buyers
search for indicators that lessen opportunism (Williamson, 1985). Furthermore, trust is
interconnected with risk (McAllister, 1995) and both are anchored in individuals’ perceptions
(Hawes, Mast and Swan, 1989). One of the outcomes of trust is that it decreases the
customer’s perception of risk related to opportunistic behaviour by the trader (Ganesan,
1994). Therefore, buyers trust sellers with respectable reputations, as such sellers are not
likely to harm their reputation in order to take advantage of a single transaction for quick
profit (Kollock, 1999).
It has long been held that trust is crucial for understanding the majority of business
exchange (Hirsch, 1976). Electronic commerce and online auctions in particular are the
latest means of business exchange in which online transactions transpire between
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individuals or organisations that have never encountered each other previously. As in the
offline world, trust in the online world has been regarded as vital for conducting business
transactions (Ba et al., 1999). Furthermore, given the impersonal nature of the online setting
and the complexity in evaluating merchandise condition prior to acquisition, trust may be
even more important in the online world (Fung and Lee, 1999). eBay places heavy
prominence on the notion that the eBay traders produce a ‘community’ founded on honesty,
trust and respect (Gray and Neist, 1999). To illustrate, eBay (2001) declares in their website
page titled ‘Company Overview’ under the sub heading ‘Our Mission’ that:
eBay was founded with the belief that people are honest and trustworthy.
We believe that each of our customers, whether a buyer or a seller, is an
individual who deserves to be treated with respect.
Fraud is a major worry for online bidders, as it erodes the trust between the trading partners.
As Haney (2001) reveals:
The bulk of electronic crimes committed in the United States last year
related to Internet auction sites and affected people between the ages of 20
and 40, according to a study released last week by New York-based market
research company eMarketer.com…
Person-to-person online auctions, such as eBay permit anyone to put up a picture and a
description of an object he or she is offering and tempt bids from potential buyers. However,
items listed are not authenticated by eBay and buyers are also unable to physically verify an
item’s authenticity. This presents an opportunity for deceitful sellers to peddle items that are
worthless or not working. Moreover, there are no methods in place to prevent sellers from
colluding with other sellers to bid on each other’s items (Gardner, 1999). In addition, buyers
and sellers are from various countries and often do not know who they are trading with,
particularly in terms of person-to-person dealings (Maggs, 2000).
Most fraud occurs when a seller receives payments with no intention of sending the product
to the purchaser and/ or the quality or features of the product delivered is not what the
purchaser anticipated (Chui and Zwick, 1999). Sellers may also open a new registration
name or work in conspiracy with certain buyers or sellers to bid on their own products and
may even submit positive feedback ranking for themselves (Kauffman and Wood, 2000).
Evidence of fraud committed by buyers has also been documented. For instance, certain
buyers may use stolen credit cards to purchase items from online auctions. According to the
Gartner Group’s study, 1.13% of the online business deals were performed with stolen credit
cards (Guernsey, 2000). There are also buyers who place fake bids and never send money;
these types of bidders are referred to as ‘deadbeat bidders’. This costs the seller time in
having to lodge a ‘non paying bidder alert’ to eBay in order to obtain payment from the buyer
or possible refund from eBay (Kane, 1999).
Like other online traders, it is crucial that online auction sites tackle any fraud anxieties that
their clients might have. As trust and reputation is important in business dealings, numerous
online auctions are supplying information to users regarding trust and reputation to assist in
lessening the fraud fears of auction traders. For instance, eBay’s online feedback forum
enables all online auction users to leave comments about each other’s buying and selling
experiences. The feedback that a user receives from other users is stored in their feedback
profile where other users can view it. This enables users to learn about the other person’s
reputation and past dealings with other buyers and sellers (Pavlou and Ba, 2000).
Such feedback instruments can encourage trust based upon reputation. Feedback can
increase cooperation, lessen opportunism, and indicate respectable reputation. With the
advent of new electronic environments in which individuals are not acquainted with each
other, reputation is undoubtedly significant in fostering trust (Fung and Lee, 1999).
A high feedback rating is an asset. Numerous online auction users state they are more
prepared to deal with sellers with a high rating or will only deal with sellers with high ratings.
In this way, certain sellers are able to develop a brand identity that enhances their number of
sales or final auction price. eBay has even included some of its most highly rated sellers on
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its home page. Such public broadcasts or reputation are likely to encourage buyers to
purchase items (Kollock, 1999).
Reputation is highly prized by both buyers and sellers who regularly prompt trading partners
to submit feedback for them. Buyers are cautious of sellers with little or no reputation rating
and sellers often declare that they will not trade with bidders who have a number of
‘negative’ feedback comments. Certain observers suspect that the feedback forum system is
central to eBay’s accomplishment and that it clarifies why buyers are prepared to forward
cheques or cash in the mail to practical strangers in the belief that the goods will be
dispatched in the advertised condition (Gray and Neist, 1999).
Nevertheless, the eBay’s feedback forum is restricted for two particular reasons. First, the
auction site does not implement sound verification procedures. This allows a person with a
poor reputation in the auction community to obtain another email address and reregister with
no link to poor reputation. Second, feedback placed against another user is not verified by
eBay. This allows spiteful exploitation of the feedback forum (Ba et al., 1999).
For example, users state the drawback of the feedback system is that a receiver of negative
feedback may retaliate and possibly have the original poster kicked off the auction site for no
valid reason (Gardner, 1999). Furthermore, sellers can post a flattering account of
themselves. Thus, a spotless feedback reputation does not guarantee the legitimacy of the
seller (Snyder, 2000).
To date, no empirical evidence demonstrates whether such electronic feedback forums
regarding reputation are meaningful (Pavlou and Ba, 2000). Even though empirical research
has recognised that a trustworthy reputation allows greater prices for merchandise, it is
nonetheless undecided whether this correlation is clear-cut in the online marketplace
(Langdon and Smith, 1998). Moreover, the majority of studies have centred on the
reputation of the product and not on the reputation of sellers with good business practices
(Rao and Bergen, 1992). One of the aims of this study was to investigate the degree to
which buyers use reputation as a signal to shape trust perceptions and examine the method
by which traders manage the risks of online auction trades.

RESEARCH METHOD
Since little research has looked at online auctions and in particular, trust in online auctions,
an exploratory study was appropriate. The case study method (Yin, 1994; Doolin, 1996) was
selected because it provided a way to explore the dynamics of a complex phenomenon.
Data was collected through in-depth semi-structured interviews with nine eBay buyers and/
or sellers. The interview data was collected using ICQ, an online text-based program that
enables data to be captured at the source and requires no transcription. The use of this
medium required that the participants be familiar with ICQ and had relatively high English
writing skills. The process of using ICQ can be compared to that of a telephone interview.
Questions relating to personal characteristics, trading experiences, trading perceptions and
effectiveness of the feedback forum were posed. During each interview, spontaneity and
tangential dialogue were encouraged to help participants to reveal possibly useful anecdotal
data (Walsham, 1995).
Initial email contact was made with 150 eBay buyers and sellers. From these, nine were
interviewed based on their varying levels of experience, gender and nationality. The sample
consisted of 4 females and 5 males, ranging in age from 22 to 62 years. Three participants
classified themselves as Sellers, 1 as a Buyer, and five bought and sold on eBay, effectively
representing the viewpoint of a total of 8 sellers and 6 buyers. Participants had 1 to 3 years
of trading experience on eBay and had participated in from 10 to 1,000 transactions. The
participants represented five countries: Australia (3); Canada (2); New Zealand (2); United
Kingdom (1) and USA (1). Table 1 profiles the participants to enable the reader to better
understand the context in which the findings were derived. Pseudonyms are used to assure
confidentiality and will be used in the findings section.
As ICQ required both the interviewer and interviewee to type responses, typing mistakes
and poor grammar sometimes occurred. Obvious spelling mistakes and poor sentence
structure were corrected to improve readability, but care was taken to ensure participants’
words and meanings were not altered in the correction process. Each transcript was edited
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within 24 hours of its completion to ensure the material was fresh in the researcher’s mind to
lessen the possibility of incorrect transcription (Yin, 1994).
The data analysis used in this research was a bottom up approach based upon several
stages of coding suggested by Strauss and Corbin (1990). The coding used their threestage process: open, axial and selective. Interview transcripts were coded into themes
grounded in the narratives of the participants. Themes were organised into categories, with
certain codes being further refined, while others remained unchanged. The final stage of the
coding process involved inspecting the data and prior themes, which included looking for
participants’ comments that demonstrated themes via comparisons and contrasts. To
strengthen the reliability of the coding process, both authors independently coded the data
and came together to discuss their findings. Where agreement could not be reached on the
interpretation of a passage, it was negotiated or excluded.
Member validity was achieved by providing the participants with a summary of the data
analysis, so that they could check the analysis of the data for accuracy and adequacy
(Neuman, 2000). To facilitate the confirmability of the current research, a comprehensive
case study database was developed to allow other researchers to follow the path from initial
research questions to final conclusions and vice versa (Yin, 1994). ICQ files and Excel
spreadsheets of raw data were maintained to provide a chain of evidence of relationships
observed in the early stages of data analysis and their subsequent modification and
refinement throughout the different phases of coding.

RESULTS
Trust emerged as an important component of trading on eBay. Indeed, two participants
declared that eBay was “all about trust”. Evidence for this strong emphasis on trust is
provided with relation to buyers desire to purchase versus negative reputation and
opportunity ease of retaliation in online environments.
Pseudonym Mary

Fred

Sue

Jill

John

Peter

Liz

Tom

Jerry

Gender

Female

Male

Female

Female

Male

Male

Female

Male

Male

Age

62

44

29

43

35

61

22

30

57

Country

Canada

New
Zealand

New Zealand

Australia

Canada

Australia

Australia

UK

USA

Rural

Urban

Urban

Rural

Urban

Rural

Urban

Urban

Urban

Urban/
Rural
Occupation

Part Time
Casino
Self
Superviso Receptionist
Employed
r
Single Mum

Unemployed Unemployed
Computer
Due to Back Community Student
Analyst
Injury
Worker

Admin
Officer:

eBay Role

Seller

Seller

Seller

Buyer

Both

Both

Both

Both

Both

Years
Trading on
eBay

1.5

2.5

2

1

3

1

1

2

3

Daily Usage
Hours

4

Often

2.5

1

3

3

1

1

2.5

Number of
items
purchased

NA

NA

NA

100

20

100

50

10

275

Number of
items sold

750

1000

281

NA

500

30

15

700

400

Manager

System
Specialist

Table 1: Profile of Participants
Trust as a facilitator of the exchange relationship
All participants appeared to support the spirit of eBay’s mission statement that “eBay was
founded with the belief that people are honest and trustworthy”.
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As the motto goes people in general are basically good
(John)
I found 99.9% of people on eBay can be trusted.
(Peter)
eBay is completely based on a trust system so that’s the way you’ve got to
use it if you want to buy something.
(Liz)
The whole concept is based on Trust …and that it works.
(Mary)
Some participants were also willing to trust new or infrequent eBay traders. For example:
…When it come to how many rating a person has got I don’t think you can
really base anything on that as everybody has got to start somewhere I
mean when I started I had a rating of zero and people bought of [sic] me and
now my rating is up to 58 and all good!
(Peter)
As a Seller myself I don’t normally judge someone by a low amount of FB
[feedback] – everyone starts somewhere and some people just don’t buy
much
(Jerry)
And, several participants also remarked they were prepared to trust other traders, even
when faced with delays or other problems. For instance:
It got to the point where he said he was putting the item in the post after the
weekend, and then nothing. There was at least 4 or 5 normal emails back
and forth, and then I didn’t get a reply after that… But really, I like to give
people the benefit of the doubt, and he could’ve died, which isn’t a very nice
thought.
(Liz)
I will give them [sellers] the benefit of the doubt in any problems that may
arise from the sale. I would expect no less for me in my sales.
(John)
Risk
The comments listed above show that risk is intrinsically linked to trust. All human
interactions that involve trust inherently hold the possibility of opportunism. This willingness
to accept risk in the exchange relationship process enables traders to obtain possible
beneficial outcomes (Jarvenpaa et al., 2000). As a result, traders put themselves at risk in
the belief that others will act honestly.
In general, buyers were willing to take the risk in order to obtain their desired purchase. The
acceptance of risk surfaced in the interviews, this clearly illuminated the fact that certain
participants were more than willing to accept risk to obtain something they desired. For
instance, when asked if she would consider purchasing an item from a seller who had more
bad feedback than good, a buyer responded:
I only ever buy things I really would like, and I don’t want anything saying
that I can’t get that item! Even if he had some bad feedback, I’d still probably
bid on the item, because he’s also got some good feedback too in most
case.
(Liz)
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Other buyers expressed similar opinions, however, they were slightly more cautious. For
example:
Probably not, BUT if he had an item that I REALLY wanted and had never
seen before on eBay I might consider it.
(Jill)
If they [seller] at the time were the only option I still would purchase from
them.
(John)
However, other buyers presented a slightly different viewpoint. Although one buyer was
willing to purchase items from sellers with some negative feedback, he asserted that this
decision would be determined by “…the percentage of neg’s [negatives] and the wording of
the negs” (Jerry).
Some sellers were also willing to take the risk and trade with buyers who had some negative
feedback. For instance, when John was asked whether he used the feedback forum to
review buyers, he responded by stating the following:
Not as often as I would like, I do sometimes. [For] example, I had one guy
who was in the negative rating – and it concerned me. I e-mailed them and
they gave me their mailing address as a form of honesty on there part. They
won the auction and had no problem with the sale or payment.
He was prepared to take the risk and trust that the buyer was stating the truth regarding his
or her address, so that he could sell the item. Moreover, another seller stated that she
reviewed the feedback system, but admitted that it was “Mostly after the fact that they won
an item” (Mary). This statement suggested that she was prepared to take the risk and trade
with buyers with some negative feedback, since once the auction closed she was obligated
to finalise the sale with the highest bidder (eBay, 2001b).
However, others were not particularly willing to take the risk. For example, one stated, “…if
someone bids on my goods and I see they have negative feedback that looks odd I ask
them to explain” (Fred). When asked what he would do if the buyer could not explain his or
her negative feedback, he responded: “it hasn’t happened, but I suppose I would retract their
bid and mail eBay informing them of the situation.”
Overall, the majority of the participants (both buyers and sellers) were willing to accept risk
as a component of trading on eBay. Clearly, their desire for an item outweighed the negative
feedback or delays in receiving goods and resulted in their trusting the other party to the
transaction.
Feedback Forum as a Control Mechanism
The most commonly used control mechanism for mitigating risk was eBay’s feedback forum.
The majority of participants found the feedback forum useful in determining people’s honesty
and ensuring that people trade honestly. Sellers relied heavily on feedback when trading. To
illustrate:
The Feedback system has a good influence and is a great device to keep
people honest… As for knowing in advance about the honesty of a person
… the more positive feedbacks I see the more I tend to trust in advance,
because I know that they are hard to get and worth a lot.
(Mary)
…It [the feedback system] is a very useful system for letting sellers sort of
know who they are dealing with.
(Sue)
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I see that since I have had more than 500 feedbacks people trust my
packing, shipping and dealing more and my business has improved a lot
and I can ask better prices too”.
(Mary)
Interestingly, buyers did not appear to use feedback to judge sellers.
I don’t generally use it to make up my mind, but yes it is a useful tool to
consider.
(Tom)
Yes I suppose so [that it is useful], but I really don’t use it much.
(Liz)
It was evident too, that a high feedback rating did not necessarily guarantee a successful
transaction process for buyers. For example, one buyer recalled he purchased an item that
he never received. He went on to state that the “Funny part is the seller had one of the
largest ratings I had ever seen on E-bay” (John). Another recounted a similar situation: “I’ve
only ever once lost my money, and this was to a guy who had lots of perfect feedback” (Liz).
Another buyer highlighted the fact that a seller’s negative feedback does not imply that the
trade will be a failure. She provided an example of an encounter with a seller from England
who had some negative feedback and described this trade as “…brilliant. I suppose some
people are never happy” (Jill).
Retaliatory Feedback
A problem that was identified with the feedback forum was retaliatory feedback, which could
unfairly impact on other traders’ perceptions of their honesty. A number of different
perspectives on this issue were expressed. For instance, one buyer/ seller felt the feedback
system needed to be “…improved upon – removal of obviously retaliatory FB would be my
#1 improvement” (Jerry). While another thought that negative feedback comments appeared
to be a result of “…name calling and other silly comments that get left by both parties…”
which he described as “… just pathetic” (Tom).
Two sellers recalled instances when they had been personally involved with retaliatory
feedback:
I had one person who has left bad feedback because I did.
(Sue)
I left him some negative feedback and they in return left some for me which
is one thing about the feedback rating I do not like. I did nothing wrong in the
sale yet I got negative feedback and it takes my rating point down by one… I
have been trying to get a higher rating and every time I leave negative
feedback I take the risk of them returning it and I lose a rating point for it.
(Jerry)
John also recounted an example of retaliatory feedback that involved “one-upmanship”:
I gave him neg [negative] FB – he replied with the same – I replied the
reason he gave it to me [which was retaliatory]. I – at the time had a good
amount of FB – he had very little – less than 20-30 so I felt it hurt him much
more than me – but frankly I gave it to him more because of his attitude than
anything else.
Although several participants expressed concerns regarding retaliatory feedback, most
traders perceived that this problem was not extreme. This outlook was clearly captured in
the following remark by Jerry “I think a lot of the neg FB’s received are received by people
that know they deserve them and don’t retaliate.” Nevertheless, he also noted that there
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“…are always a few [retaliators] and you or at least I always worry that the next one I give I’ll
get one in return.”
Given these concerns, some participants altered their usage of the feedback system as a
result of retaliatory negative feedback. For example:
No I have made it a policy NOT to leave neg feedback … because I think it
is better not to give any feedback than to give neg feedback…neg feedback
attracts neg feedback so if you do it to someone else they hit you with a neg
feedback which never looks good.
(Fred, Seller)
I am loathe to leave negative feedback and cannot remember a single
instance when I have, so I don’t consider that an option, for the sake of
ruining my own profile with petty bickering”.
(Tom, Buyer/ Seller)
All in all, the feedback forum was perceived to be a useful control mechanism for assessing
traders’ honesty. Nevertheless, as John declared, “…with everything its [the feedback
system] still not perfect.”
Figure 1 summarises these emergent themes and the way in which they influence the
development and maintenance of trust in eBay trader exchange relationships.
Control
Mechanism
•

Feedback

Formation of
Disposition/Attitude
Risk

To Trust

Trust in
Online

Exchange
Relationship

Auctions

Figure 1: Proposed Model of Trust in Online Auction Exchange Relationships

DISCUSSION
These findings demonstrate that trust is an integral part of participants’ trading experiences
and that without trust they would not trade on eBay. The theme of trust and the factors that
influenced the formation of their disposition/ attitude to trust emerged throughout the
interviews. Furthermore, the evidence presented within this research suggested there were
a number of factors that influenced the formation of trust, for instance, risk and feedback.
Indeed, participants viewed eBay as being “all about trust”. The current findings confirm the
importance of trust for sustaining business relationships reported in previous research (for
instance Ba et al., 1999; Fung and Lee, 1999).
The feedback system appears to be effective in assisting traders in forming an attitude about
the trustworthiness of others. Previous research on online trading has reported no
meaningful empirical support for feedback systems with respect to reputation (Pavlou and
Ba, 2000). Although, empirical research has reported that a trustworthy reputation allows
greater prices for products, it is nonetheless undecided whether this correlation is clear-cut
in the online marketplace (Langdon and Smith, 1998). The current findings show mixed
support that the feedback mechanism was effective in assisting participants to assess the
honesty of others. Some of the buyers stated they did not “really use” the system to judge
other people and a small number of participants suggested that the feedback system could
not be relied upon “as gospel”. However, one of the sellers noted that she obtained higher
prices for her items when her feedback rating exceeded 500, as buyers trusted her business
dealings.
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This study provides initial evidence linking reputation with buying behaviour. The findings
show negative reputation does not necessarily deter buyers from purchasing a product
particularly when the product is appealing or rare. Thus highlighting the need for further
research into the effectiveness of feedback systems to explore this link between trust and
reputation.
The discussion with the participants also underlined a problem with the feedback system,
namely retaliatory feedback. As a result, certain participants altered the way they use the
feedback system by implementing a policy of not leaving negative feedback. Such actions by
traders may be detrimental to the effectiveness of the feedback system, particularly if high
numbers of traders use this strategy to avoid retaliatory feedback problems.
The literature regarding the feedback system has described the problem of eBay not
verifying the feedback placed against users and how this creates the potential ease of
opportunity to place retaliatory feedback (for instance Ba et al., 1999; Gardner, 1999),
however the consequences and implications of this problem have not previously been
addressed. The current findings confirm this problem exists and extend the current body of
knowledge by uncovering the strategy of not giving negative feedback to discourage other
traders to do the same despite the ease of opportunity to do so. The main precursors to this
decision revolve around the fear of malicious retaliation and the consequent impact this may
have on their reputation and rating level.
Implications for Practice
These findings report some issues with respect to online auction exchange relationships and
suggest some strategies to help increase trust between traders and assist in encouraging
potential buyers to bid in this new online auction environment. As the perception of
reputation of an online auction seller is vital to buyer trust, online sellers should do what they
can to raise awareness of these available control mechanisms.
Buyers appear to be aware of and use the feedback forum, but eBay provides another
control mechanism (‘me page’), that none of the participants discussed. New or less wellknown sellers on eBay may be able to build and promote their reputations by describing their
business history and/ or personal background via the ‘me page’. This facility enables traders
to present a profile of themselves to potential eBay traders. Online sellers should promote
the ‘me page’ to buyers and also clearly state their policies for customer satisfaction, returns
and refunds within their selling pages. They might also present a list of positive feedback
with respect to the quality, fairness and efficiency of their service.
Advising online sellers to publicise their business history, personal background and
reputation on the ‘me page’ facility might seem trivial, however it does have the potential to
provide vital information and is grossly under-utilised.
Implications for Future Research
This is an exploratory study that sought to collect ‘rich data’ from a limited number of
participants. As such, it provides a sound basis for broader investigations of eBay use, as
suggested by Hochschild (cited in Neuman, 2000: 198):
Intensive interviews are a device for generating insights, anomalies, and
paradoxes, which later may be formalised into hypothesis that can be tested
by quantitative social science methods.
These findings have only addressed a limited sample of eBay traders, and as such, are not
positioned to explore the wider implications of issues raised. This suggests the need for
further systemic research to authenticate the findings proposed here and to ascertain the
validity of the explanatory scheme.
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